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Abstract
We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms
of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition
structures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition
structures always exist, and provide su¢ cient conditions for the existence of con-
tractually Nash stable and weak individually stable coalition structures on the class
of separable games.
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1 Introduction
One possibility to study the process of coalition formation is to model it as a hedonic
coalition formation game. In such a model each players preferences over coalitions depend
only on the composition of members of her coalition. The formation of societies, social
clubs and groups are examples in which the hedonic aspect of coalition formation (cf. [11])
plays an important role. Given a hedonic game, the main interest is then in the existence
of outcomes (partitions of the set of players) that are stable in some sense. For example,
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the focus in [1], [3], [5], [6], [7], [8], and [10] is on the existence of core stable partitions,
while [4] and [5] contain su¢ cient conditions for the existence of Nash and individually
stable partitions as well.
Most of the stability concepts studied in the literature presuppose that the players in
the game are myopic in the sense that they do not take into account how their decisions to
form a coalition will a¤ect in the future the decisions of other players. Furthermore, these
stability concepts are based either on coalitional deviations (core and strict core stability)
or on individual deviations (Nash, individual, and contractual individual stability).
In this paper we suggest a unied look at the nature of the possible deviations from a
given coalition structure, and o¤er a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic
games. In doing so, we require, no matter how the additional properties of the deviation
look like, that there should always exist at least one player who has a strong incentive to
move. In this way we describe, including the ve stability notions mentioned above, ten
di¤erent stability concepts for hedonic games. However, not all of these ten notions deserve
a special attention because, as it can be shown, there are always coalition structures that
are stable in the sense of four of these stability concepts and, moreover, without any
preference restrictions. This is the reason why we focus mainly on the existence of two of
the new stability concepts - contractual Nash stability and weak individual stability.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce in Section 2 some preliminaries on
hedonic games and di¤erent stability concepts that can be found in the literature. A
taxonomy of myopic stability concepts is then presented in Section 3, where di¤erent
implications between the stability notions are discussed as well. Sections 4, 5, and 6 are
devoted to contractual strict core stability, contractual Nash stability and weak individual
stability, respectively. We show that contractual strictly core stable coalition structures
always exist. Moreover, on the class of separable games, a weak mutuality condition
su¢ ces for the existence of contractual Nash stable partitions, while asolidarity property
guarantees the existence of weak individually stable coalition structures. We conclude in
Section 7 with some nal remarks.
2 Preliminaries
Consider a nite set of players N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng. A coalition is a non-empty subset of N .
For each player i 2 N , we denote by Ai = fX  N j i 2 Xg the collection of all coalitions
2
containing i. A collection  of coalitions is called a coalition structure if  is a partition
of N , i.e., the coalitions in  are pairwise disjoint and
S
X2X = N . For each coalition
structure  and each player i 2 N , by (i) we denote the coalition in  containing i, i.e.,
(i) 2  and i 2 (i).
We assume that each player i 2 N is endowed with a preference i over A
i, i.e.,
a binary relation over Ai which is reexive, complete, and transitive. We denote by
= (1;2; : : : ;n) a prole of preferences i for all i 2 N . Moreover, we assume that
the preference of each player i 2 N over coalition structures is purely hedonic, i.e., it is
completely characterized by i in such a way that, for each coalition structure  and 
0,
each player i weakly prefers  to 0 if and only if (i) i 
0(i). A hedonic game hN;i
is a pair of a nite set N of players and a preference prole .
Now we dene stability concepts based on coalitional deviations and on individual
deviations, which can be found in the literature. Let hN;i be a hedonic game and let
 be a coalition structure. We say that
  is core stable if there does not exist a coalition X such that
 X i (i) for all i 2 X;
  is strictly core stable if there does not exist a coalition X such that
 X i (i) for all i 2 X, and
 X j (j) for some j 2 X;
  is Nash stable if there does not exist a pair (i;X) of i 2 N and X 2 [f;g such
that
 X [ fig i (i);
  is individually stable if there does not exist a pair (i;X) of i 2 N and X 2 [f;g
such that
 X [ fig i (i), and
 X [ fig j X for all j 2 X;
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  is contractual individually stable if there does not exist a pair (i;X) of i 2 N and
X 2  [ f;g such that
 X [ fig i (i),
 X [ fig j X for all j 2 X, and
 (i) n fig j (i) for all j 2 (i) n fig.
Observe that strict core stability implies core stability, Nash stability implies individual
stability, and individual stability implies contractual individual stability. Moreover, strict
core stability implies individual stability as well.
3 Taxonomy and interpretations
In this section, we rst dene several sets of coalitions capturing the nature of deviating
coalitions for those stability concepts introduced in the previous section. Then, in terms
of these sets, some new stability concepts are introduced.
Let hN;i be a hedonic game, and let  be a coalition structure. By all() we
denote the set of all possible deviations from , i.e.,
all() = 2N n ( [ f;g):
We next dene the sets weak(), strong(), nash(), and cont() as follows:
strong() = fX 2 all() j 8i 2 X [X i (i)]g;
weak() = fX 2 all() j 8i 2 X [X i (i)] and 9i 2 X [X i (i)]g;
nash() = fX 2 all() j 9i 2 X [X n fig 2  [ f;g and X i (i)]g;
cont() = fX 2 all() j 8i 2 N nX [(i) nX i (i)]g:
Then, we have the following observation.
Observation 1 The stability concepts introduced in the previous section can be described
in terms of weak(), strong(), nash(), and cont() as follows:
 is core stable , strong() = ;;
 is strictly core stable , weak() = ;;
 is Nash stable , nash() = ;;
 is individually stable , nash() \weak() = ;;
 is contractual individually stable , nash() \ cont() \weak() = ;:
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Our rst example is meant to illustrate the usefulness of dening stability concepts in
terms of the above sets of deviations.
Example 1 Consider a hedonic game hN;i with N = f1; 2; 3g and = (1;2;3)
dened as follows:
f1; 2g 1 f1g 1 f1; 2; 3g 1 f1; 3g;
f1; 2; 3g 2 f1; 2g 2 f2; 3g 2 f2g;
f1; 2; 3g 3 f1; 3g 3 f2; 3g 3 f3g:
From jN j = 3, there are ve possible coalition structures, and according to the preference
prole , the sets weak(), strong(), nash(), and cont() for each coalition
structure  are as follows.
 weak() strong()
ff1g; f2g; f3gg ff1; 2g; f2; 3gg ff1; 2g; f2; 3gg
ff1; 2g; f3gg ff2; 3gg ;
ff1; 3g; f2gg ff1g; f1; 2g; f2; 3g; f1; 2; 3gg ff1g; f1; 2g; f1; 2; 3gg
ff1g; f2; 3gg ff1; 2gg ;
ff1; 2; 3gg ff1gg ff1gg
 nash() cont()
ff1g; f2g; f3gg ff1; 2g; f1; 3g; f2; 3gg ff1; 2g; f1; 3g; f2; 3g; f1; 2; 3gg
ff1; 2g; f3gg ff1; 2; 3gg ff1; 2; 3gg
ff1; 3g; f2gg ff1g; f1; 2g; f1; 2; 3gg ff3g; f2; 3g; f1; 2; 3gg
ff1g; f2; 3gg ; ff1; 2; 3gg
ff1; 2; 3gg ff1gg ff2; 3gg
For this hedonic game, we have
 two core stable coalition structures ff1; 2g; f3gg and ff1g; f2; 3gg,
 no strictly core stable coalition structure,
 one Nash stable coalition structure ff1g; f2; 3gg,
 two individually stable coalition structures ff1; 2g; f3gg and ff1g; f2; 3gg,
 three contractual individually stable coalition structures ff1; 2g; f3gg, ff1g; f2; 3gg,
and ff1; 2; 3gg.
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all() weak() strong()
all()
strict core
stability
core stability
nash() Nash stability
individual
stability
weak
individual
stability
cont()
contractual
strict core
stability
contractual
core stability
nash() \ cont()
contractual
Nash stability
contractual
individual
stability
weak
contractual
individual
stability
Table 1: Correspondences between stability concepts and sets of coalitions
From the other combinations of weak(), strong(), nash(), and cont(), we
obtain several other stability concepts, namely
 is weak individually stable , nash() \ strong() = ;;
 is contractual strictly core stable , cont() \weak() = ;;
 is contractually core stable , cont() \ strong() = ;;
 is contractually Nash stable , nash() \ cont() = ;;
 is weak contractual individually stable , nash() \ cont() \ strong() = ;:
The correspondences between the stability concepts and the sets of coalitions all(),
weak(), strong(), nash(), and cont() are shown in Table 1.
For example,  is weak individually stable if nash()\strong() = ;, which means
that there does not exist a pair (i;X) of i 2 N and X 2  [ f;g such that every player
j 2 X [ fig is strictly better o¤ when player i joins X (i.e., X [ fig j (j) for all
j 2 X [ fig). Clearly, weak individual stability is implied by core stability, because
nash() \ strong() = ; when strong() = ;. On the other hand, weak individual
stability is also implied by individual stability, because strong()  weak() and
hence nash() \ strong() = ; when nash() \weak() = ;.
Example 2 Consider the hedonic game hN;i dened in Example 1. For this game, we
have
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 two weak individually stable coalition structures ff1; 2g; f3gg and ff1g; f2; 3gg;
 three contractual strictly core stable coalition structures ff1; 2g; f3gg, ff1g; f2; 3gg,
and ff1; 2; 3gg;
 three contractually core stable coalition structures ff1; 2g; f3gg, ff1g; f2; 3gg, and
ff1; 2; 3gg;
 two contractually Nash stable coalition structures ff1g; f2; 3gg, and ff1; 2; 3gg;
 three weak contractual individually stable coalition structures ff1; 2g; f3gg, ff1g; f2; 3gg,
and ff1; 2; 3gg.
Observe that, for every coalition structure , we have the following inclusions:
strong()  weak()  all():
Hence, in each row of Table 1, the stability notion in the rst column implies the oth-
ers, and the stability notion in the second column implies the one in the third column.
Moreover, the following inclusions also hold:
nash() \ cont()  nash()
 
cont()  all():
Hence, in each column of Table 1, the stability notion in the rst row implies the others,
the stability notion in the second row implies the one in the fourth row, and the stability
notion in the third row implies the one in the fourth row as well.
Now let us explain why there are two empty cells in Table 1. The rst empty cell
corresponds to all()\all() = all() = ;. Observe that we have all() = ; if and
only if jN j = 1, which is the trivial case with the unique coalition partition  = fNg. The
second empty cell corresponds to a coalition structure  such that cont() \ all() =
cont() = ;. Notice that in this case it is not even indicated why a coalition X 2
cont() deviates from a coalition structure , and hence, the notion of a deviation does
not make sense. Indeed, cont() = ; only if  = fNg; otherwise, N 2 cont().
4 Contractual strict core stability
We start our study of the new stability notions presented in the previous section by show-
ing that a contractual strictly core stable coalition structure always exists. As a related
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result, it was shown in [2] that, on any preference domain, a contractual individually stable
coalition structure always exists, where a coalition structure  is contractual individually
stable if and only if nash() \ cont() \weak() = ;. Here, we slightly extend this
result. Namely, we show that, on any preference domain, a contractual strictly core stable
coalition structure always exists. Recall that a coalition structure  is contractual strictly
core stable if
cont() \weak() = ;;
i.e., there does not exist a coalition X such that X i (i) for all i 2 X, X j  (j) for
some j 2 X, and (i) nX i (i) for all i 2 N nX.
According to the arguments in the previous section, for every coalition structure ,
we have the following inclusions:
nash() \ cont() \ strong()  nash() \ cont() \weak()
 
cont() \ strong()  cont() \weak():
Hence, contractual strict core stability implies contractual core stability, contractual in-
dividual stability, and weak contractual individual stability. Our result implies that,
on any preference domain, there always exists a coalition structure which is contractual
strictly core stable, contractually core stable, contractual individually stable, and weak
contractual individually stable.
Proposition 1 A contractual strictly core stable coalition structure always exists.
Proof. A contractual strictly core stable coalition structure can be constructed by the
following algorithm:
Step 1. Set  := fNg.
Step 2. Repeats the following until cont() \weak() = ;:
 Find an X 2 cont() \weak().
 Set  := fY nX j Y 2  and Y 6 Xg [ fXg.
Step 3. Return .
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Let  be an arbitrary coalition structure such that cont()\weak() 6= ;, and let
X 2 cont() \weak(). Then consider 0 = fY nX j Y 2  and Y 6 Xg [ fXg.
Observe that 0 is a coalition structure as well. Thus, by starting with the coalition
structure fNg, a coalition structure will be obtained when the algorithm halts. Since the
algorithm halts when cont() \ weak() = ;, the outcome  of the algorithm is a
contractual strictly core stable coalition structure.
Moreover, for each i 2 N ,
 if (i) \X = ;, we have 0(i) = (i),
 if (i) \X 6= ; and i 2 X, we have 0(i) = X i (i) from X 2 weak(), and
 if (i) \X 6= ; and i 62 X, we have 0(i) = (i) nX i (i) from X 2 cont().
In other words, no player i is worse o¤ being in 0(i) than being in (i). From
X 2 weak(), there is at least one i 2 X such that 0(i) = X i (i). Observe that,
without being worse o¤, each player i can be better o¤ at most jAij   1 = 2n 1  1 times.
It follows then that Step 2 in the algorithm repeats at most n2n 1 n times, and therefore,
the algorithm halts.
Remark 2 Indeed, in [2] a similar algorithm was proposed for showing the existence of a
contractual individually stable coalition structure. Here we essentially show that a similar
argument works for a stronger stability concept as well.
5 Contractual Nash stability
The notion of contractual Nash stability applies to situations in which, in order to move
to another coalition, the corresponding player needs only the permission of her current
coalition to leave. Imagine for example a criminal society that is already partitioned into
groups. In such an environment it seems very plausible that it is easier for someone to
join a criminal group than to get a permission to leave an already existing group she is a
member of.
More formally, let hN;i be a hedonic game, and let  be a coalition structure. As
dened previously, a partition  is contractually Nash stable if
nash() \ cont() = ;;
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i.e., there does not exist a pair (i;X) of i 2 N and X 2 [f;g such that X[fig i (i),
and (i) n fig j (i) for all j 2 (i) n fig.
Before we precede to our result on contractual Nash stability, let us introduce the
domain of separable preferences and additive preferences.
Denition 1 A preference prole = (1;2; : : : ;n) is separable if, for every i; j 2 N
with i 6= j and for each X 2 Ai with j 62 X,
 fi; jg i fig if and only if X [ fjg i X, and
 fi; jg i fig if and only if X [ fjg i X.
Denition 2 A preference prole = (1;2; : : : ;n) is additive separable if, for
every i 2 N , there exists a real-valued function vi : N ! R such that for every X;Y 2 A
i
 X i Y if and only if
P
j2X vi(j) 
P
j2Y vi(j).
For further purposes in this paper, we will redene separability in the following manner.
For each i 2 N , let Gi, Ui, and Bi be the sets of desirable, neutral, and undesirable
coalitional partners, respectively, of player i, i.e.,
 Gi = fj 2 N n fig j fi; jg i figg,
 Ui = fj 2 N n fig j fi; jg i figg, and
 Bi = fj 2 N n fig j fi; jg i figg.
Obviously, (Gi; Ui; Bi) is a partition of N n fig. Then, separability can be dened in
terms of (Gi; Ui; Bi) as follows. A preference prole = (1;2; : : : ;n) is separable if,
for every i; j 2 N with i 6= j and for each X 2 Ai n Aj,
 j 2 Gi if and only if X [ fjg i X,
 j 2 Ui if and only if X [ fjg i X, and
 j 2 Bi if and only if X [ fjg i X.
10
Let us now redirect our attention to the existence of contractually Nash stable coalition
structures. First, as a related result, it was shown in [4] that if the additive separable
preference domain is under consideration, then imposing symmetry (i.e., vi(j) = vj(i) for
every i; j 2 N) on playerspreferences guarantees the existence of a Nash stable coalition
structure. Moreover, symmetry is a critical condition for this result in the sense that a
Nash stable coalition structure may fail to exist by weakening symmetry to mutuality.
Recall that a preference prole satises mutuality if, for every i; j 2 N , i 6= j,
 j 2 Gi if and only if i 2 Gj,
 j 2 Ui if and only if i 2 Uj, and
 j 2 Bi if and only if i 2 Bj.
Clearly, under additive separability, mutuality means that, for every i; j 2 N , i 6= j,
 vi(j)  0 if and only if vj(i)  0.
Notice further that, even with mutuality and on the additive separable preference do-
main, contractual Nash stability is strictly weaker than Nash stability. This is illustrated
by our next example containing a game for which a contractual Nash stable coalition
structure exists and no Nash stable coalition structure exists. This example is given in [3]
and used in [4] to show the nonexistence of individually stable coalition structures, which
implies the nonexistence of Nash stable coalition structures.
Example 3 Consider the hedonic game hN;i with N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g and an additive
separable preference prole  dened by the following vis.
v1(1) = 0; v1(2) = 1; v1(3) =  4; v1(4) =  4; v1(5) = 2;
v2(1) = 2; v2(2) = 0; v2(3) = 1; v2(4) =  4; v2(5) =  4;
v3(1) =  4; v3(2) = 2; v3(3) = 0; v3(4) = 1; v3(5) =  4;
v4(1) =  4; v4(2) =  4; v4(3) = 2; v4(4) = 0; v4(5) = 1;
v5(1) = 1; v5(2) =  4; v5(3) =  4; v5(4) = 2; v5(5) = 0:
It can easily be veried that vi(j)  0 if and only if vj(i)  0 for each i; j 2 N , i.e.,
mutuality is satised. Observe that, for each coalition structure , nash() 6= ; if jXj  3
or jXj = 1 for some X 2 . In fact, each coalition structure  contains at least one such
a coalition X. Therefore, a Nash stable coalition structure does not exist.
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Now consider the coalition structure  = fNg, and we show that  is contractually Nash
stable. Observe that nash() = ff1g; f2g; f3g; f4g; f5gg. Further, for each i 2 N , there
exists j 2 N such that j 6= i and vj(i) > 0. It follows that (j) n fig = N n fig j
N = (i) for some j 2 N n fig. Hence, fig 62 cont() for each i 2 N . Therefore,
nash() \ cont() = ;, i.e.,  is contractually Nash stable.
The next example shows that, again on the additive separable preference domain, con-
tractual Nash stability is strictly stronger than contractual individual stability. Namely,
for the hedonic game shown in the example, no contractual Nash stable coalition structure
exists and a contractual individual stability exists.
Example 4 Consider the hedonic game hN;i with N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and an additive
separable preference prole  dened by the following vis.
v1(1) = 0; v1(2) = 0; v1(3) =  2; v1(4) = 1;
v2(1) =  2; v2(2) = 0; v2(3) = 0; v2(4) = 1;
v3(1) = 0; v3(2) =  2; v3(3) = 0; v3(4) = 1;
v4(1) = 0; v4(2) = 0; v4(3) = 0; v4(4) = 0:
As mentioned in the previous section, on any preference domain, a contractual individ-
ually stable coalition structure always exists. Let  = ff1g; f2g; f3; 4gg. Then, we have
weak() = ff1; 4g; f2; 4gg, but f1; 4g; f2; 4g 62 cont() from f3g 3 f3; 4g. Thus,
nash() \ cont() \weak() = ;, i.e.,  is contractual individually stable.
Now we show that a contractually Nash stable coalition structure does not exist. Ob-
serve that we have v1(3) = v2(1) = v3(2) =  2 and
P
j2X vi(j)  1 for each i 2 N and
for each X 2 Ai. Thus, for each coalition structure ,
 f2g 2 nash() \ cont() if (1) = (2),
 f1g 2 nash() \ cont() if (1) = (3),
 f3g 2 nash() \ cont() if (2) = (3),
and hence,  is contractually Nash stable only if (1), (2), (3) are three di¤erent
coalitions. Let  be a coalition structure for which this is indeed the case. Then, we have
 f1; 4g 2 nash() \ cont() if (4) = f4g,
 f1; 3; 4g 2 nash() \ cont() if (4) = f1; 4g,
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 f1; 2; 4g 2 nash() \ cont() if (4) = f2; 4g,
 f2; 3; 4g 2 nash() \ cont() if (4) = f3; 4g.
Therefore, nash()\cont() 6= ; for each coalition structure , i.e., a contractually
Nash stable coalition structure does not exist for this game.
We are ready now to provide a su¢ cient condition for the existence of a contractu-
ally Nash stable coalition structure. In order to state our result, we allow for a larger
domain, namely the domain of separable preference proles, and impose a weaker version
of mutuality.
Let = (1;2; : : : ;n) be a preference prole. We say that  is weakly mutual if,
for each i 2 N ,
 i 2 Gj for some j 2 N if Gi 6= ;.
Clearly, weak mutuality is implied by mutuality.
Proposition 2 Let hN;i be a separable hedonic game satisfying weak mutuality. Then,
a contractually Nash stable coalition structure exists.
Proof. Let hN;i be as above and let S =
S
i2N Gi. By denition, for each i 2 S, there
exists j 2 N such that i 2 Gj, and conversely, for each i 2 N nS, we have i 62 Gj for each
j 2 N . Then, let  be a coalition structure dened as follows:
 =

fSg [ ffig j i 2 N n Sg if S 6= ;;
ffig j i 2 Ng otherwise.
Observe that we have (i) = S if i 2 S, and otherwise (i) = fig. In the following, we
show that  is contractually Nash stable if  satises weak mutuality, i.e., i 2 Gj for
some j 2 N if Gi 6= ;. By denition of nash(), it su¢ ces to show thatfig [ (j) 62
nash() \ cont() for each i; j 2 N .
Let i 2 N n S. By denition, we have (i) = fig (no matter S is empty or not).
Moreover, we have i 62 Gj for each j 2 N , and by weak mutuality, we have Gi = ; (i.e.,
j 2 Ui [Bi for each j 2 N). It follows that fig [(j) i fig = (i) for each j 2 N , and
therefore, fig [ (j) 62 nash() for each j 2 N .
Let i 2 S. By denition, we have (i) = S, and there exists k 2 N such that i 2 Gk,
and thus, Gk 6= ;. By weak mutuality, we have k 2 G` for some ` 2 N , and thus, k 2 S
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as well. From i 2 Gk and i 2 S = (k), we have (k) n (fig [ (j)) k (k) for each
j 2 N n S, and thus, fig [ (j) 62 cont() for each j 2 N n S. Moreover, we have
fig [ (j) = (i) 62 cont() for each j 2 S. Therefore, fig [ (j) 62 cont() for each
j 2 N .
Remark 3 Observe that playerspreferences in the hedonic game of Example 4 are sepa-
rable (more precisely, additive separable), but they do not satisfy weak mutuality. Hence,
weak mutuality is a critical condition for the existence of contractually Nash stable coali-
tion structures.
6 Weak individual stability
We turn now to the study of weak individual stability. Recall that a coalition structure
 is weak individually stable if
nash() \ strong() = ;;
i.e., there does not exist a pair (i;X) of i 2 N and X 2 [f;g such that X[fig j (j)
for all j 2 X [ fig.
Notice that, as it can be illustrated by means of Example 3 (cf. [4]), there are additive
separable hedonic games satisfying mutuality with no weak individually stable coalition
structures. It follows that even if preferences are additive separable, requiring mutuality
does not su¢ ce for the existence of weak individually stable coalition structure.
In order to present an existence result for weak individually stable coalition structures,
we introduce a solidarity condition. It has a very intuitive interpretation and says that if
a player j likes another player i, then all undesirableplayers for i are also undesirable
for j.
Let = (1;2; : : : ;n) be a preference prole. We say that  satises solidarity if,
for all i; j 2 N ,
 i 2 Gj implies Bi  Bj [ fjg.
In our next lemma, we show an important implication of this condition.
Lemma 4 Let hN;i be a hedonic game satisfying solidarity. For every i; j 2 N with
i 6= j, Gi [ Ui [ fig = Gj [ Uj [ fjg if i 2 Gj and j 2 Gi.
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Proof. Let hN;i be as above, and let i; j 2 N be such that i 6= j, i 2 Gj, and j 2 Gi. By
solidarity, we have Bi  Bj[fjg and Bj  Bi[fig. It follows that Gj[Uj  Gi[Ui[fig
and Gi [ Ui  Gj [ Uj [ fjg. Therefore, Gi [ Ui [ fig = Gj [ Uj [ fjg.
As it turns out, this implication of the solidarity condition guarantees the existence
of weak individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games.
Proposition 3 Let hN;i be a separable hedonic game satisfying solidarity. Then, a
weak individually stable coalition structure exists.
Proof. Let hN;i be as above and let  be the coalition structure constructed by the
following algorithm.
Step 1. Set  := ; and R := N .
Step 2. Repeats the following until R = ;:
 Find one of the largest coalitions X  R such that for each nonempty proper
subset Y of X, there exists pair (i; j) of i 2 Y and j 2 X n Y satisfying i 2 Gj
and j 2 Gi.
 Set  :=  [ fXg and R := R nX.
Step 3. Return .
In graph theoretical terms, each X 2  is a connected component of the undirected
graph G = (N;E) with node set N and edge set E = ffi; jg  N j i 6= j; i 2 Gj; j 2
Gig. Hence,  is the unique partition of N into connected components of G = (N;E).
Obviously,  constructed by this algorithm is a coalition structure. By applying Lemma
4 it can be easily shown that Gi [ fig = Gj [ fjg for each X 2  and for every i; j 2 X,
which implies that X  Gi [ fig for each i 2 X.
Now we show that  is weak individually stable by contradiction. Suppose there is a
pair (i;X) of i 2 N and X 2  [ f;g such that X [ fig j (j) for all j 2 X [ fig, i.e.,
X [ fig 2 nash() \ strong(). For each i 2 N , we have (i)  Gi [ fig from the
construction of , which implies (i) i fig. Therefore, fig 62 nash(), i.e., X 6= ;.
Let X 2 . From X [ fig i (i), it is obvious that X 6= (i), and by separability,
there exists k 2 X such that k 2 Gi. From X [fig j X for each j 2 X and separability,
we have i 2 Gk. Thus, X [ (i) is such that, for each nonempty proper subset Y of
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X [ (i), there exists pair (i; j) of i 2 Y and j 2 (X [ (i)) n Y satisfying i 2 Gj and
j 2 Gi, which contradicts to the largestness of each coalition in .
Notice nally that if we narrow the domain of separable preferences by requiring that
each player views every other player either as a desirable or as a undesirable coalitional
partner (i.e., Ui = ; for all i 2 N), then the solidarity condition guarantees the existence
of individually stable coalition structures as well. This is due simply to the fact that in
such an environment weak individual stability and individual stability coincide.
7 Conclusion
The taxonomy of stability concepts for hedonic games o¤ered in this paper relies on
the simple observation that each deviation from a coalition structure reects di¤erent
degrees of social intervention in ones strong wish to migrate to another group of players.
The di¤erences in the social intervention were taken into account when constructing the
di¤erent sets of coalitional deviations that, in turn, led to several new stability notions.
It was shown that contractual strictly core stable coalition structures always exist, while
on the class of separable games one needs additional conditions in order to assure the
existence of contractually Nash stable and weak individually stable coalition structures.
As mentioned in the Introduction, our taxonomy considers only myopic stability con-
cepts. However, it would be worthy to place the newly introduced stability notions in a
framework in which players are farsighted in the sense that they take into account how
their decisions to form a coalition will a¤ect in the future the decisions of other play-
ers. If playerspreferences are strict, it was shown in [9] that all core stable structures
are coalitional farsightedly stable as well, and that a corresponding result holds true for
Nash stability but neither for individual stability nor for contractual individual stability.
Since both contractual strict core stability and weak individual stability are weaker con-
cepts than individual stability, one would expect that the corresponding farsighted notions
would rene their myopic counterparts. On the other hand, contractual Nash stability is
weaker than Nash stability and stronger than contractual individual stability. Hence, one
needs further investigations on how the relationship between the corresponding farsighted
and myopic counterparts of this stability notion would look like.
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